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“Cognition comes through comparison.”
A Russian proverb
Abstract 
Central Asia?! For many scholars, policy-makers and the general public in different parts 
of the world, Central Asia remains an unknown region. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
in the early 1990s, Central Asia emerged as a separate region comprising fi ve newly independent 
states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.1 This study aims to 
present regional integration efforts in Central Asia by comparing them with integration process-
es and schemes in East Asia and Southeast Asia. Such a comparative analysis allows for insight-
ful refl ections on the cases of Asian regional integration, and shows there is much to learn about 
and from regional integration experiences in Asia. The fi rst part of the paper compares regional 
trends and features and the second part discusses key factors to explain differences and similari-
ties between the regions and their regional integration efforts. The study is a descriptive analysis 
comparing the internal dynamics and external forces that drive the integrative realities and po-
tentials in these two regions.
1. Introduction 
There are many academic works on trends and characteristics of regionalism and various 
aspects of regional integration efforts in different parts of the world. After the successful Euro-
pean integration, regionalism has become an important topic of discussion among academics 
and policy-makers around the world. Regional processes and projects in Europe, the Americas, 
Africa and Asia are widely discussed and comprehensively analyzed. The topic of Central Asian 
regionalism emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Yet, regional processes and 
integration efforts in this part of the world remain under-researched, especially when compared 
with other regions of the world.2 
Central Asia presents many challenging questions and issues for integration studies. For 
instance, as far as the identity dimension of regional integration is concerned, there are such 
questions as: where does Central Asia belong? Is it part of Asia? If yes, what are the indicators? 
Generally, what can we call Asia? Where does it start and where does it end? Some believe that 
norms, values and politics–not geography–differentiate West from East, Europe from Asia. “The 
West is about values and politics, not about geography.”3 At the same time, most Central Asians 
look like typical Asians. Does that imply that the commonality of appearance is a result of the 
common historical and geographical realities and challenges? Perhaps appearance may be mis-
leading, and the historical experience of being a part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union 
has impacted Central Asia in a very unique and profound way. 
This paper does not attempt to engage in the identity or history discourse; the preceding 
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lines are included only to highlight the importance of identity, i.e., to have a clear picture of the 
criteria which defi ne the borders between Asia and non-Asia, especially when it comes to models 
of regionalism. 
Central Asia needs to develop a model of regional integration. At the global level, European 
integration is perceived to be the model. However, the regional integration practices in East Asia 
and Southeast Asia have presented a different form of regional integration. The East Asian/South-
east Asian experience and practices could be instructive for Central Asia. This is not to say that 
Central Asia is a part of Asia and has to orient itself eastwards, nor is it to imply that “asianization 
of Central Asia” is taking place or should take place. However, there are no reasons to deny that 
possibility, either. 
The purpose of the present study is to identify differences and similarities in the variety of 
patterns of regionalism in Central, East, and Southeast Asia. The European integration scheme is 
often called “institution-driven,” while East Asian regionalism is generally described as “market-
driven.” Regionalism in Southeast Asia and East Asia shows that “it is possible to have high 
levels of cooperation with low levels of institutionalization.”4 There are some other signifi cant 
features of Asian regionalism which make it different from other cases of regionalism.
Within this paper regional cooperation, regional integration and regionalism are used as in-
terchangeable concepts,5 defi ned generally as a “set of policies whereby state and non-state actors 
cooperate and coordinate strategies within a given region.”6 As for the concept of “regionaliza-
tion,” this analysis employs the defi nition given by Paul Evans as an “expression of increased 
commercial and human transactions in a defi ned geographical space.”7 The concept of “region” 
is also a very loose notion. This study takes the view that regions can be constructed and re-
constructed. The notion of “region” is meant to outline a certain group of countries which are 
united by common interests, threats or vision. The fundamental point to note about regions is the 
logic of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. That is, the concept of “region” creates “outsiders” and 
“insiders,” and as such, it may not be helpful or “suitable as dominant membership criterion”8 for 
a regional institution. Today, the geographical understanding of regions does not necessarily cor-
respond with their political margins; certain political and economic considerations may draw up 
different memberships irrespective of geographical borders. 
The present study is organized around two case studies: Central Asia and the broader post-
Soviet space, and East Asia including the sub-region of Southeast Asia. The case selection for 
a comparison is based on several important assumptions. First, the regions under consideration 
are regions from a geographic viewpoint but also enjoy a considerable degree of socio-cultural, 
economic and political cohesion. Secondly, all regions in one way or another face common chal-
lenges, parallel issues and similar problems, although they fi nd themselves in different stages of 
state and market development. Moreover, the Central Asian and the East Asian cases examined 
here are both about “Asian” regional integration. 
Obviously, Central Asian regional integration can be compared with what has been taking 
place in other parts of the world. A comparison could be made with the regionalism experience 
in the Americas, Africa, Middle East, South Asia, Europe, East Asia, or any other region. The 
primary difference of Central Asian states and the region as such is that Central Asia fi nds itself 
in its early formative years, unlike most of the other regions.  Having said this, it is important to 
note that this comparative study will have meaning when it is possible to disregard, to a certain 
extent, the time factor, and look at the contextual factors and realities of the regions in order to 
identify differences and similarities. It should not be forgotten that this paper does not aim to 
compare parallel processes in the two regions. 
More specifi cally, the present study will examine the Southeast Asian regional integration 
experience and integration processes in the broader region of East Asia and compare it with the 
emerging efforts at integration in Central Asia. For this purpose, available offi cial, academic and 
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scholarly materials were reviewed. Several insightful interviews with leading experts and schol-
ars on regional integration were conducted; interviews on East Asian and Southeast Asian region-
alism were conducted among scholars residing in Japan, and interviews relating to Central Asian 
regionalism were conducted among scholars residing in Kyrgyzstan. 
Theoretically, the study is conducted within the framework of the dominant approaches in 
International Relations: realist, liberalist, constructivist and “domestic structure” (domestic power 
relationships and state-society relations). It shares the view presented by proponents of analytical 
eclecticism that there is a “need to build bridges between multiple analytical perspectives.”9 The 
complexity of the post-Soviet realities of Central Asia and the need to understand and explain 
these realities in the most effi cient way does not allow presuming the superiority of one particu-
lar theoretical tradition. Central Asian countries at the same time need to focus on building their 
nation-states and have to fi nd their niche in the rapidly regionalizing and globalizing neoliberal 
world. Moreover, it is important for them to improve their governance system and state-society 
relations, especially taking into account that these new, smaller countries of Central Asia had 
never experienced independent nationhood and statehood before. They need to construct their na-
tion-states, to engage in social engineering to certain extent. These imperatives and the develop-
ments resulting from them in this region lend themselves to an analytical framework that is fl ex-
ible enough to incorporate both state- and civil society-oriented factors, both traditional national 
security and nontraditional security interests and concerns, and both domestically and externally 
driven processes; hence the eclectic approach of this analysis. The primary levels of analysis are 
sub-regional and regional; national and global levels are employed throughout the discussion of 
external and internal factors affecting regionalism. The paper consists of two parts. In the fi rst 
and principal part of the paper, regional trends and features will be outlined and compared, and 
the second part will discuss key factors to explain the differences and similarities between the re-
gions and their regional integration efforts. 
2. Locating and Defi ning Regions 
(1) Post-Soviet Space/Central Asia
The post-Soviet space or region refers to the 15 former Soviet republics. Generally, the 
space can be divided into fi ve groupings. Each grouping is characterized by the commonality of 
geographical, socio-cultural and historical factors and specific relations with Russia. They in-
clude:
Baltic (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania);• 
Eastern Europe (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine);• 
Transcaucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia);• 
Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan);  • 
Eurasia (Russia). • 
This structuring of the post-Soviet space is helpful for analysis of post-Soviet regional coopera-
tion and integration processes; however, interestingly enough, there is not even one regional or-
ganization which strictly corresponds to the groupings’ makeup as such. 
Central Asia is located in the heart of the Eurasian continent, and is widely recognized as a 
region at the crossroads of civilizations (Western/Christian, Islamic, Chinese, etc.). As mentioned 
above, since 1993, Central Asia has been defi ned as a group of fi ve states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-
stan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Previously, during the Soviet period, the region 
was called Middle Asia and Kazakhstan (Srednaya Azia i Kazakhstan). Some basic information 
about the fi ve states is provided in Table 1 of Appendix I. 
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(2) East Asia/Southeast Asia
East Asia is a vast region, and when it comes to analyzing regional cooperation in East Asia, 
it is necessary to differentiate between such areas as Northeast Asia (China, Japan, the Korean 
peninsula, Taiwan, Mongolia and the Russian Far East), Southeast Asia (the ten ASEAN mem-
ber-states), and East Asia (ASEAN+3 and some countries of Northeast Asia or Asia Pacifi c).10 
The combination of political and geographical defi nitions of Southeast Asia results in a total 
of 11 states, 10 of which are member-states of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). 
The eleven states are Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and East Timor (not a member of ASEAN). Basic information on 
East Asian and Southeast Asian states is provided in Table 2 of Appendix II. 
3. Overview of Regional Integration in East Asia, Southeast Asia and Central Asia
(1) A Success Story 
Southeast Asian regionalism is a case of sub-regionalism in relation to East Asian regional-
ism. The role of Northeast Asian states–especially Japan in the early stages of cooperation and 
China later on–has been critical to the development of Southeast Asian regionalism. The regional 
processes in Southeast Asia and generally in East Asia are closely interrelated. Nowadays, when 
East Asian regionalism concentrates on the ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit (ASEAN+6) 
formats, the role of ASEAN seems to be as one of the decisive factors shaping East Asian coop-
eration. 
ASEAN was established in 1967, when five of the pro-western states in Southeast Asia 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) decided to create an intergov-
ernmental organization. Back then, they did not have much in common beyond problems and 
threats. Similar to the current states of Central Asia, the founding states of ASEAN “disputed 
territorial and ethnic issues with each other, and there were no common factors promoting re-
gional cooperation, other than their mutually shared anti-communist stance.”11 In this view, two 
important features of ASEAN must be highlighted: the principle of non-intervention, and the ar-
rangement for a dialogue with any and all external powers. Mutual respect of each other’ s sover-
eignty and the ability to create a dialogue platform with external powers have made it possible to 
talk about the success of regional cooperation efforts in Southeast Asia. “As ASEAN developed 
a habit of dialogue that led to an evolution of healthy intra-regional diplomatic ties in the next 
stage of development, ASEAN also started to strengthen ties by establishing regular dialogues 
with external partners such as the US, the EEC, Japan, etc.”12 It is conceivable that the latecom-
ers to ASEAN would not have joined the grouping, and the number of ASEAN states would not 
have reached ten in 1999 if it had not been for the first-order criterion providing for the non-
intervention into the internal affairs of each other.13 The second condition was also critical for the 
success of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. The “ASEAN way” is often mentioned as a 
ready answer for explaining ASEAN achievements. Relevant to the context of Central Asia, the 
magic of the “ASEAN way” appears to be in the ability of ASEAN states to take “a collective ne-
gotiation approach aligning member states’ requirements.”14 The result of the dialogue platform 
and ASEAN conferences is evident in the proliferation of regional integration organizations with 
ASEAN as the core actor. These organizations include the Asia Pacifi c Economic Cooperation 
forum (APEC, established in 1989), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, 1994), the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM, 1996), ASEAN+3 (1997) and the East Asia Summit (EAS, 2005). Figure 1 lists 
the ASEAN States and Dialogue Partners, and displays the scheme of regional integration frame-
works in East Asia (see Appendix III). 
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(2) Not Yet a Success Story
With the collapse of the Soviet state, a number of regional organizations have emerged in 
the post-Soviet space aimed at providing different formats for inter-state cooperation, which are 
quite compelling for the land-locked countries of Central Asia. The first organization was the 
Commonwealth of Independent States established in 1991, which signifi ed above all the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the need for facilitating the disintegration of the former Soviet republics 
and their re-integration into newly defi ned bases. The case of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) clearly shows the post-Soviet realities–the parallel processes of disintegration and 
integration. This reshaping is a fundamental, specifi c characteristic of the post-Soviet regional 
process. 
Another important point to make about regionalism in Central Asia is the absence of a re-
gional institution that unites only the Central Asian states. There have been several attempts to 
create a Central Asian Union or Central Asian Cooperation Organization, but one has yet to be 
successful. If we follow the logic that “the first reaction usually appears to be the right one,” 
Central Asian states reacted naturally (in terms of identity and survival) in the very beginning–
immediately after the collapse of the USSR–when on December 8, 1991, the Soviet Union was 
dissolved and the Commonwealth of Independent States was established by the leaders of Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus with the signing of the Belavezha Accords. The fi ve leaders of the Central 
Asian states met in Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan, on December 13, 1991, and discussed 
the new political situation and their collective approach to the newly created CIS. The decision 
was to create an ad hoc Central Asian Commonwealth and negotiate with the Slavic states of 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus on behalf of the Central Asian states to join CIS as equal and found-
ing member states. Later, Central Asian regional cooperation continued as a series of summits in 
the early to mid-1990s. “These included the January 1993 Tashkent Summit with a Protocol of 
Five Central Asian States on a Common Market, in which the decision was made on naming the 
region as Central Asia; the January 1994 Tashkent Summit, with the creation of the Central Asian 
Common Economic Space (CES); the April 1994 Cholpon-Ata summit, with agreements on co-
operation in various fields; the July 1994 Almaty meeting aimed at building a comprehensive 
economic and defense union; the creation of a Central Asian Bank for Cooperation and Develop-
ment (CABCD) in Bishkek in August 1994; and the approval of a fi ve-year integration plan dur-
ing the April 1995 Bishkek summit.”15 
When Tajikistan re-joined the Central Asian Economic Union in 1998,16 the “Central Asian 
Union” was renamed “Central Asian Economic Cooperation” as it recognized the inability to 
reach the ambitious goal of a Union. In 2002, the organization was renamed once again the 
“Central Asian Cooperation Organization” (CACO). In 2004 Russia decided to join CACO, and 
in 2005 CACO merged with the Russia-dominated Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), sig-
nifying the suspension of the Central Asian integration idea. After that, President Nazarbaev of 
Kazakhstan tried to revive the idea of re-establishing the Central Asian Union in April 2007, but 
only Kyrgyzstan expressed its support while the other states of Central Asia remained skeptical. 
How can we understand such skepticism? Some scholars argue that this skepticism is a result of 
these factors:
Escalating intra-regional disputes over non-demarcated inter-state borders and transna-• 
tional water resources management;
Ethnic tensions rooted in pre-Soviet and Soviet periods, such as those that led to the vio-• 
lent clash between Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010; 
The disruptive geopolitical impact of major external powers such as Russia, China and • 
the USA; 
The inability to share a common history, as in the case of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in its • 
dispute over the Samarkand and Bukhara, and the absence of direct fl ights between Tash-
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kent and Dushanbe;
Regional leadership competition between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan;• 
Perhaps the most important limiting factor, the divergent political-economic paths and • 
strategies adopted by each of the regional states, leading them into different directions 
and destinations.17
Kazakhstan is becoming positively different from the other Central Asian states in terms 
of its economic performance. In Table 1, the GDP per capita of Kazakhstan is at least 5-6 times 
higher than that of the other Central Asian states. The large territory of Kazakhstan enjoys a vast 
store of hydrocarbon and other natural resources, is effectively managed by proper internal eco-
nomic reforms, and within the past decade, balanced foreign economic policies have resulted in 
obvious economic success. The country’ s outstanding economic performance has led them into 
the position of regional leader in Central Asia, and most of the external powers recognize  Ka-
zakhstan’ s leading role. Evidence of this acknowledgment is shown in Kazakhstan’ s ascendancy 
to chairmanship in Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010. 
Uzbekistan perceives all integration initiatives with suspicion even though it realizes eco-
nomic benefits and gains that cooperation bring. Without Uzbekistan all regional projects fail 
since Uzbekistan’ s location is strategic and central to the region. It seems that Uzbekistan is not 
yet ready to accept Kazakhstan’ s regional leadership role, although it is becoming an objective 
reality.
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have similar economic problems and resources. Both countries 
are upstream countries and share a similar position on the regional water resources management 
question. Tajikistan has experienced civil war, while Kyrgyzstan has experienced two political 
upheavals during the last 10 years. In terms of foreign policy–especially concerning integration–
Kyrgyzstan has always been supportive and pro-integrationist. Tajikistan wishes to integrate 
more with Iran and Afghanistan as it is the only Persian speaking nation in Central Asia.
Turkmenistan is a self-suffi cient state economically, and has been acting in accordance with 
the declared ‘positive neutrality,’18 which “prevented any meaningful cooperation by Turkmeni-
stan within regional and supra-regional arrangements.”19
Thus, the situation in Central Asia is quite complicated. Central Asian regionalism is un-
derdeveloped to the extent that it is not realistic to talk about the existence of regionalism; there 
are only the efforts to create regionalism. Yet, one has to avoid an oversimplifi cation of the re-
gional integration processes in Central Asia that simply states that regionalism in Central Asia 
has failed. Regionalism is not only about regional politics and policies but also about internal and 
external dynamics which evolve and change. 
4. The Role of External Powers
(1) Story of a Not-Yet Benign External Power
A prominent feature of post-Soviet integration is the issue of regional leadership or hege-
mony by Russia. Due to the historical domination of Russia over Central Asian lands for more 
than a century (since the middle of the 19th century until 1991) and the civilizational importance 
of the Russians and the Russian language in the development of Central Asian societies and 
states, the interrelationship of Russia and the Central Asian states is extraordinarily important 
and complicated. Russia still feels responsible for the region, especially in view of the numerous 
ethnic Russians living in the region. Russia’ s leading role in such regional organizations as the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the 
Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) and even the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 
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where Russia’ s leadership is balanced with China, is unquestionable. 
The post-Soviet states, which were not happy with Russia’ s politics and policies within the 
post-Soviet realities, considered them “neo-imperialistic” when they established the regional or-
ganization GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova) in 1997. The reasons behind the 
establishment of GUAM involved the territorial and economic disputes with Russia, and alleged-
ly the unoffi cial support of the United States in establishing an anti-Russian regional institution.20 
Uzbekistan, noticeably the most “nationalistic” state in Central Asia, which had a special and 
close relationship with the United States until the tragic Andijan event in May 2005, also joined 
GUAM in the period of 1999-2005, renaming it GUUAM. Uzbekistan’ s anti-Russian sentiment 
was evident throughout its history at both the elite and public levels. Independent Uzbekistan 
was straightforward in its interest in “pushing Russia out of the region” and President Karimov 
of Uzbekistan accused his Central Asian colleagues (except Niyazov of Turkmenistan) of being 
unjustifi ably close to Russia.21 At the same time, the smaller states of Central Asia such as Kyr-
gyzstan and Tajikistan consider the partnership with Russia as strategic and primary, especially 
in security issues. The April 2010 political overthrow of the Bakiev regime in Kyrgyzstan and 
the resulting political and social instability in the country showed the dependence of Kyrgyzstan 
on Russia both in terms of its mental orientation and for material support. Some claim that Rus-
sia played a role in the April events in Kyrgyzstan.22 The bloody ethnic confl ict in June 2010 in 
the south of the country resulting from the extremely unstable and uncertain political situation 
pushed the interim government of Kyrgyzstan to seek Russia’ s military assistance for the man-
agement of its confl ict in the south.23 Finally, Russia decided to act through CSTO by providing 
technical assistance but offered neither military involvement with the CSTO peacekeeping troops 
nor a supply of weapons, since according to the CSTO statute it has no right to be involved in the 
internal confl icts of the member states.24 
The above cases show that Russia is viewed by some Central Asian states as the only “secu-
rity manager” in the region, and Russia in turn gives strong incentives to be viewed as such. The 
positive and negative meanings of Russia’ s being the “security manager” in the region have cer-
tain implications for regional cooperation in Central Asia and its impact will depend on the lead-
ers and leadership policies of Russia. As rightly argued by Robert Keohane, “hegemony is less 
important for the continuation of cooperation, once begun, than for its creation.”25 The scheme of 
multilayered structures within the regional institutions of the post-Soviet arena shown in Appen-
dix IV indicates that Russia is present in all regional organizations, along with the participation 
of the Central Asian states, excepting the Economic Cooperation Organization. If scholars and 
politicians state that regional cooperation in Central Asia is unsuccessful and underdeveloped, it 
has something to do not only with the limited political will and capacity for cooperation of the 
regional states but also with the leading actor’ s political will (or lack thereof) to push for mean-
ingful cooperation. 
(2) Story of a Benign External Power 
Japan is perceived very differently in Southeast Asia and East Asia. From one side, Japan’ s 
role in the economic success of most Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian states is undeniable. 
The Japanese origin of MNCs’ (multinational corporations) activities as well as FDI (foreign di-
rect investment), and ODA (offi cial development assistance), as well as the technology transfer 
to these regions were crucial for the development of Southeast Asia and East Asia.26 At the same 
time, the historical memories of the militarist Japan are still alive in China, in the Korean penin-
sula and in some countries of Southeast Asia. These memories add “complexity to the discussion 
of Japan as a future initiator of policy change and as a dominant actor in its regional organiza-
tion.”27 
When discussing the regional leadership role of Japan in East Asia, one also has to consider 
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the politics and policies of the United States, the super power with long-lasting interests and le-
verage in the region. The close security, political and economic relations between Japan and the 
Unites States created conditions for effective regional cooperation. On the other hand, as Katzen-
stein argues, the attitude of the United States towards regional integration in Asia was not sup-
portive of multilateralism. “After 1945 the United States enshrined the principle of bilateralism 
in its dealings with Japan and other Asian states.”28 At the same time, this fi rmly established bi-
lateral approach with regard to the security alliance between the United States and Japan allowed 
Tokyo to concentrate on economic development rather than worry about its security.29 
Normative and institutional approaches indicate the leading contribution of Japan to East 
Asian regionalism. Terada convincingly argues that Japan is “responsible for three normative 
transformations”30 in the process of evolution of Asian regionalism. First, the gradual involve-
ment of the Japanese government with regard to the bottom-up logic of regional economic 
cooperation in East Asia makes it different from regionalism in Europe, North America, Latin 
America, Africa and even Southeast Asia. The governmental institutions were not involved in 
the initial stages of establishing regional economic institutions. The non-governmental approach 
through activities of PAFTAD (Pacifi c Trade and Development) and PBEC (Pacifi c Basin Eco-
nomic Council) and then of PECC (Pacifi c Economic Cooperation Council, a quasi-governmen-
tal regional institution), worked well enough “in building the sense of shared interests and mutual 
trust necessary for establishing an intergovernmental regional body such as APEC.”31 Thus, one 
can observe a different–Asian–approach in preparing a regional institution (APEC) that later 
functioned in a non-binding manner, unlike typical western regional institutions. The interests of 
ASEAN and other Asian states and of the developed member states of APEC were properly fa-
cilitated by Japan.
Second, there was a gradual shift of purpose from economic cooperation to trade liberaliza-
tion, in which Japan played an important, if not always a leading role. More developed members 
of APEC were pushing forward trade liberalization initiatives, while ASEAN countries were 
interested in developing cooperation. Here, the broadminded and progressive position of Japan 
was signifi cant. APEC was able to follow its non-discriminatory approach in trading as desired 
by most of the ASEAN and APEC countries. Japan shifted its approach toward establishing a 
multilayered trade policy through FTAs in a timely and balanced manner, which resulted in the 
ASEAN+3 becoming the primary format for advancing Japan-ASEAN and East Asian FTAs and 
encouraging competition in FTA strategies between Japan and China.
Third, open membership was then considered. After the Asian financial crisis, Japan re-
evaluated its position towards East Asian cooperation. When Japan proposed in 1997 to establish 
an Asian Monetary Fund, the United States vigorously opposed this initiative since it was clearly 
downplaying the role of the IMF. The skillful policies of Japan developed to balance the inter-
ests of the United States through APEC and at the same time to advance East Asian regionalism 
through the visions of the East Asia Summit and East Asian Community are worthy of admira-
tion. 
Japan was able to make all of these transformations not only owing to its progressive lead-
ers’ ability to suggest non-governmental and governmental approaches as needed in order to 
encourage proper focus on ‘regionalization,’ but also because of Japan’ s recognition and accom-
modation of the unmistakable infl uence of the United States. The United States wanted to see 
China’ s growing power in Asia adequately balanced by strong Japanese leadership in both South-
east Asia and East Asia, while observing that ASEAN leaders make right conclusions/preferences 
when the timing was right.32 Japan shared the concern over China’ s growing power and infl uence 
in regional political and economic affairs. Japan’ s adept approach to regional affairs is also evi-
dent in its promotion of ASEAN+6, which includes the ASEAN+3 countries and India, Australia 
and New Zealand, which would have the effect of defusing China’ s infl uence in these regional 
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frameworks.  Most recently, Tokyo has expressed its interest in joining the Trans-Pacifi c Partner-
ship (TPP).33
5. Key Factors Accounting for Regional Similarities and Differences
This part of the paper identifies factors which explain the differences and similarities in 
the regional cooperation/integration patterns in East Asia/Southeast Asia and Central Asia. It is 
an absolute truism that these regions are different; clearly there is no need to compare identical 
entities. The question to start with is then: why should we compare these regions? What good 
reasons exist for these comparisons? First of all, there are claims by Asian leaders, in referring to 
the regionalism in Southeast Asia and the wider region of Asia-Pacifi c, that they have developed 
a distinctive model of cooperation that is different from the European model.34 In this view, it 
would be instructive to see whether there are practices and policies in East Asian/Southeast Asian 
regionalism schemes that can be emulated in Central Asia. Another reason for regional compari-
son is to see whether there are objective historical and civilizational grounds to adapt certain fea-
tures of the Asian regionalism model to the case of Central Asian regionalism.
(1) Differences: Contextual Conditions 
The geographic location and the demographic potential of the regions are different. Central 
Asia is a landlocked region, while most of the Southeast Asian states have access to the sea. The 
scale of population and hence capacities of each state and their markets are also different. 
Another visible factor for the difference between the regions is historical, that is, their “pre-
independence experiences.” For Central Asia, their pre-independence experience is the “Soviet 
experience”; for East Asia, the experience is of being on the periphery of a capitalistic world. 
Central Asia was an integral part of the Soviet Union– “the great integration project”–that even-
tually failed. Central Asia was integrated into the USSR by force and was fi nally disintegrated by 
“chance” (meaning that Central Asia did not fi ght for its independence and independence came to 
them unexpectedly). Hence, the logic of the relationship in post-Soviet Central Asia is as follows: 
integration during Soviet times and disintegration/re-integration within post-Soviet times. East 
Asian nations, on the other hand, never experienced integration within a joint state and started 
building their nations and states in the post-colonial context. The post-Soviet reality is partially 
post-colonial at least from the perspectives of Central Asia since it contained the center-periphery 
relations. But it also concerned the collapse of the single state–the Soviet Union–while most 
other colonizing countries such as Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands continued to exist. 
Japan, too, was a colonizer and an imperial power before and during the Second World War vis-
à-vis its Asian neighbors, but it never absorbed them into one state system, nor did it collapse as 
a state after its defeat in the war.
Another obvious difference is the extent of marketization in the two regions. East Asian 
countries developed in the context of colonial capitalism and a post-colonial capitalist economy, 
while Central Asian countries started discovering the market economy and democracy only after 
1991. In addition, not all of the Central Asian countries quickly embraced the opportunities of the 
newly discovered liberal political economy. They continued and still continue to live under the 
deep ideological and structural effects of communism and the planned economy system forced 
upon them during the Soviet period. The point here is not so much a time factor but the structural 
and contextual conditions that existed when the marketization process began in these two re-
gions.
26
(2) Differences: Geopolitics 
The geopolitics of regionalism is an external factor, i.e., an independent variable in the for-
mulation of regionalism, and cannot be shaped by the will and capacity of the regional states. The 
geopolitical situations in these regions show signifi cant differences. 
First, Russian-US relations in Central Asia are dramatically different from Japanese-US re-
lations in East Asia. In contrast to the robust and evolving Japan-US alliance, the long-lasting an-
tagonism between Russia and the United States has become a kind of political truism. Nowadays, 
it is hopeless to wait for a partnership between Russia and the United States which would encour-
age development and prosperity in the Central Asian region, taking into account disagreements 
between these states that exist at the global level in all possible aspects, political, economic, 
military, energy, etc. In the long run, the substance and logic of US-Russian relations may change 
because of the radical changes we see in the positions of the Islamic world and the rapidly devel-
oping China. 
Second, the United States does not really support regionalism in Central Asia since almost 
all of the regional institutions operating in the post-Soviet space (except perhaps the Economic 
Cooperation Organization and OSCE) have either an alleged pro-Russian or anti-American char-
acter, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In the beginning of the post-Cold War era, 
the United States knew very little about Central Asia even to have a position towards emerging 
regional integration initiatives. In the early stages of discovering Central Asia, the Unites States 
preferred a bilateral approach. Later in 2005-2006, Washington proposed the idea of a “Greater 
Central Asia,”35 which was associated with another project initiated in 2004 by the United States–
the “Greater Middle East” project. The idea was to provide an alternative to Central Asian states 
and turn their foreign policy vectors towards the southern horizon by considering the fi ve Central 
Asian states and Afghanistan as one political/military and economic region.  
Third, China identifies itself as a clearly East Asian nation and state, although theoreti-
cal and conceptual speculation abounds that China has ambitions to serve as a bridge between 
Southeast Asia/East Asia and Central Asia. This bridge would act to propagate Asian regionalism 
at the continental level where China would play a central role. At present, however, the role and 
place of China in Southeast Asia/East Asia and Central Asia seems to be different. In East and 
Southeast Asia, China has been competing with Japan for regional leadership. China is consid-
ered an internal regional state in East Asia, while for Central Asians China remains an alien and 
unknown power that is gradually engaging itself into the region–most notably in economic terms. 
China and Russia, through activities within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, pursue their 
regional and global interests in the post-Soviet space, which in most parts appear to be anti-West-
ern or anti-American. At the same time, China’ s power in Southeast Asia and East Asia is being 
counterbalanced by the individual or concerted actions of Japan and the United States. 
Fourth, as mentioned above, the role of major external powers and their intentions towards 
a region are critical to encourage or limit regionalism in the region. Japan’ s decision to cooper-
ate with ASEAN with huge economic resources was a very important factor for the success of 
ASEAN. Japan was genuinely interested in Southeast Asia for diplomatic and economic reasons. 
Southeast Asian countries needed Japan’ s economic assistance. In Manila in 1977 Prime Min-
ister of Japan Fukuda announced that “Japan was ready to help promote peaceful coexistence 
of the ASEAN and Indochinese countries, and Offi cial Development Assistance (ODA) money 
would be used to induce cooperation.”36 The same kind of positive initiative could be proposed 
by Russia in Central Asia, since there are similar kinds of preconditions and expectations. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’ s collapse, Russia was weak while undergoing diffi cul-
ties and challenges of the Soviet disintegration similar to other former Soviet republics. Within 
the last decade Russia has been gaining its economic and political strength, and today Russia po-
sitions itself as one of the major powers not only in the post-Soviet region but worldwide. Mos-
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cow’ s July 2008 Foreign Policy Concept resounds with Russia’ s perceived resurgence in both 
global aspirations and responsibilities near and abroad. The FPC asserts a “real capacity to play a 
well-deserved role globally” as one of the “infl uential centers in the modern world.” One of Rus-
sia’ s chief foreign policy objectives, per the FPC, is “to promote good neighborly relations with 
bordering States, to assist in eliminating the existing hotbeds of tension and confl icts in the re-
gions adjacent to the Russian Federation . . . and to prevent emergence of the new ones.”37 At the 
same time, for Russia the former Soviet Union’ s space is much more important than other world 
regions, not only because there is a growing interest and presence of other major powers in the 
region, but because, fi rst and foremost, Russia shares many historical, security, economic and so-
cial ties with Central Asian countries and societies. These ties can be a good ground for the mu-
tual development and cooperation on projects with the leading role of Russia manifested through 
bilateral relations, as well as multilateralism of existing regional institutions. Moscow’ s will and 
ability is yet to be tested.
(3) A Puzzling Factor
The main difference between Central Asia and Southeast Asia is the existence of ASEAN 
in Southeast Asia and the absence of such a purely regional organization in Central Asia. There 
is no regional institution which includes only Central Asian states even though there have been 
attempts to create one. Such attempts have not been successful, nor are they likely to be success-
ful in the foreseeable future, mainly because of the diffi culties between the states, accompanied 
by disruptive external impacts. In other words, Central Asia does not act as a distinct actor in the 
world and in the region’ s international relations, while Southeast Asia through ASEAN enjoys 
just such a representation. There is a view that the current Central Asian region is an object of 
world politics, rather than a subject. The lack of success despite efforts made to create a purely 
Central Asian regional cooperation framework is truly a puzzling reality. 
There are challenges, risks, and problems in the region which have a transnational character, 
and it requires a consolidated regional approach to address them. On April 9, 2007, in his attempt 
to revive the idea of Central Asian integration, President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan stated that “he 
fails to understand why there is no Central Asian Union, because it is benefi cial not only in terms 
of economic benefi ts but fi rst of all in terms of providing security.”38 Indeed, it is puzzling why a 
territory of 60 million people, with complementary economies, a common language, a reasonably 
effi cient transport and transit infrastructure, suffi cient energy resources, and common historical 
and cultural traits cannot integrate within a single regional framework. 
(4) Further Differences: Institutionalization 
The number and the nature of existing regional institutions in the post-Soviet space result 
mainly from the European model-oriented regional processes. The logic is top-down, where 
governments play the leading role. In Southeast and East Asia, as argued earlier, regionalism has 
been primarily market-driven. The government policies that created favorable conditions for the 
development of intraregional economic trade and cooperation have been a necessary but not suf-
fi cient action in the development of regionalism in Southeast and East Asia. The Customs Union 
of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan which began functioning in January 2010 defi nitely can be 
considered a step towards Eurasian Economic Community integration. It signifies a European 
type of economic cooperation rather than an Asian type; the latter relies mainly on bilateral and 
multilateral FTAs. At the same time, the establishment of the Customs Union which is designed 
to integrate the most developed economies in the post-Soviet space clearly shows the tendency to 
under-appreciate the interests of the less-developed states in the region. In the case of ASEAN, 
the principle to proceed at the pace of the slowest of its members has been an effective instru-
ment in the region-building process. At that, it should not be forgotten that ASEAN has suc-
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ceeded economically, but politically remains weak in terms of institutionalization and normative 
formal integration. 
It is fair to argue that everything has an opposite, i.e., the other side of the coin. The key 
factors identifi ed above which explain existing differences between the two regional cases at the 
same time allow for contrasting conclusions. The remaining sections help to explain the existing 
similarities in the logic and trends of the two regional cases. 
(5) Similarities: Nation-Building Rather than Region-Building 
The important similarity which is rooted in the context of regional integration processes is 
the pre-occupation with nation-building processes rather than region-building, unlike the case of 
Europe in the early stages of its regionalism. As noted by Yeo Lay Hwee,“sovereignty in several 
of these Southeast Asian states was hard-earned and the internal diversities within each of the 
member states made nation-building and not region-building the most important task for the post-
colonial leaders.”39 Similar processes have been taking place in Central Asia. With the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the newly created states of Central Asia have started exploring independence 
in the post-Soviet realities, and have been preoccupied with the state and nation building process. 
As known from the theory and practice of nation-building and state-building, these processes are 
highly infl uenced and constrained by the ethnic diversity of a state.40 All Central Asian countries 
have been ethnically heterogeneous for centuries–a factor which was largely irrelevant during 
the Soviet Union but has grown in signifi cance in the post-Soviet period. As rightly summarized 
by John Glenn, “nation-building during the soviet era can be characterized by the following con-
cepts ‘fl ourishing (ratsvet), coming together (sblizhenie) and fi nal fusion (sliyanie) of the nations 
into a new historical community of Soviet people (Sovetskii narod)’ along with the idea of build-
ing a single soviet socialist state.”41 Such social engineering projects were supposed to be accom-
plished through the realization of “national delimitation” policy in the mid-1930s and resulted in 
the “creation of titular ethno-national republics with their ‘artifi cial’ borders including nontitular 
minority peoples.”42 Thus, the issue of ethnic minorities emerged in Central Asia and remained a 
latent social problem with a high confl ict potential. The latent inter-ethnic tensions have become 
acute and visible already, as in the confl ict in Osh of Kyrgyzstan in 1990, and manifested again in 
the bloody June 2010 event in the south of Kyrgyzstan.  
A similar ethnically diverse situation was present in Southeast Asia since independence 
and even during the period of ASEAN formation through today. In the earlier years, “the newly 
independent member states were new political entities with ‘weak’ state structures” that lacked 
a close congruence between ethnic groups and territorial boundaries, and sustained, also, “an 
equally problematic lack of strong regime legitimacy.”43
(6) Similarities: Authoritarian Regimes
As the ‘puzzling factor’ mentioned above suggests, the absence of an ASEAN type organi-
zation for Central Asia and the nature of regimes in both regions are similar at least in their early 
stages of regionalism development. As Amitav Acharya suggests, “ASEAN’ s primary concern 
has been with regime survival,”44 and ASEAN continues to play a role in maintaining “strong au-
thoritarian states.”45 This similarity is indicated not to suggest that Central Asian leaders must de-
velop a genuine Central Asian regional institution for protecting their own regimes, but to stress 
that the impetus for integration should come from within the country, and the motivation of lead-
ers is decisive especially within the realities of their authoritarian states. The Akaev and Bakiev 
regimes of Kyrgyzstan showed that leaders might pursue regime or personal interests that support 
neither national nor regional interests.
29
(7) Similarities: The Multilayered Structure of Regional Institutions 
Another similarity between the two regions as shown in the appendices is the existence of a 
multilayered structure of regional institutions. This similarity is important as an indicator of the 
tendency to have a variety of regional organizations for accommodating differences in the priori-
ties and interests of the regional states and external powers. The study conducted by the Asian 
Development Bank on Asian regionalism fi nds that “cooperation is likely to evolve gradually, 
with different groups of countries progressing at varying speeds, using several frameworks and 
forums to address subsets of policy interests.”46 Indeed, the emergence of some regional institu-
tions in the post-Soviet space is explained by the necessity to have a narrow group of countries 
which are interested in stronger security or economic cooperation. Evidence to this is the appear-
ance of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Commu-
nity (EEC) out of the member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Those coun-
tries interested in closer security cooperation joined the CSTO while those interested in closer 
economic relations became members of the EEC. However, the absence of an exclusively region-
al organization in Central Asia, similar to ASEAN in Southeast Asia, downplays the importance 
of the multilayered structure in the post-Soviet space for Central Asian states, since they remain 
vulnerable “to internal threats aggravated by external predators taking advantage of a confl ict-
ridden regional environment.”47 There is a strong and urgent need for Central Asian countries to 
negotiate between each other and adopt and specify a set of norms for intra-regional relations. 
(8) Similarities: Strategic Imperatives vis-à-vis External Powers
There are some parallels in the historical evolution of Southeast Asia and Central Asia. By 
the 19th century, the Western colonial powers had come to dominate Southeast Asia and their in-
fl uence became a barrier to the development of any kind of regional identifi cation or sentiment. 
The Russian Empire came to Central Asia in the mid-19th century to dominate the region, impor-
tant for its strategic location and available resources in the context of the “Great Game” between 
the British and Russian Empires. During the Cold War period, after gaining independence, South-
east Asia remained an unstable and volatile region in the context of rivalry between the United 
States and the Soviet Union “as well as a battlefi eld in the confl ict between China and the Soviet 
Union.”48 The lessons from colonial oppression informed the way Southeast Asian states viewed 
the regional environment and so they decided to form a united front against external forces politi-
cally and ideologically. As Narine argues, the suspicions of the Southeast Asian states in the fi eld 
of international relations, as well as the perception of external threat, have played a critical role 
in the shaping of regionalism in Southeast Asia since the colonial period.49 Similar to the case of 
Southeast Asian countries, which succeeded in managing their relations with the United States, 
Japan and China, Central Asian countries need to learn how to negotiate their relations with the 
major external powers such as China, the United States and Russia. 
6. Conclusion: Lessons for Central Asian Regionalism
Briefl y summarizing the above discussion, one can say that the comparison between the two 
regions has highlighted some commonalities and differences. Some observable commonalities re-
late to common challenges, while differences relate to how these challenges are being addressed, 
irrespective of the objective, especially given the differences in geography and demography.
The preliminary fi ndings of the study imply that the experience of Southeast Asian region-
alism can have relevance to the emerging Central Asian regionalism. It could be instructive in 
developing a Central Asian model of integration especially taking into account the common 
grounds in the starting conditions–the priority of nation-building over region-building, the au-
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thoritarian nature of the regimes in question, and the availability of various regional institutions 
for negotiating relations with external powers. 
One of the important virtues that can be learned from Southeast Asian regionalism is a kind 
of “pragmatism in the ASEAN way.” It is the ability to be practical and functional, even though 
not always in a formal and institutionalized way, and remaining so even when displeased with 
others. It is very important to be aware of and to visualize the necessity to cooperate, and to real-
ize the benefi ts such cooperation can bring. Early in Southeast Asia’ s development, as well as 
later in Central Asia, the sovereignty issue was fundamental; both regions had been preoccupied 
by the task of nation-building and were often led by authoritarian leaders. But authoritarian re-
gimes in Southeast Asia were able to arrive at a common ground and fi nd ways for cooperation 
for the sake of remaining in the offi ce and maintaining legitimacy by means of good governance 
targeted at economic development. Most of the Central Asian regimes are willing to retain power 
at the expense of creating a “client” society and a corrupt system of governance, both of which 
seriously hinder the development of each and all member states in the region. 
In East Asia and in the post-Soviet arena, multilayered structures of regional integration 
have already been constructed: in East Asia these are the Mekong Delta, ASEAN, ASEAN+3, 
ASEAN+6, the East Asia Summit, and APEC; and in Central Asia, the Eurasian Economic Com-
munity-Customs Union, CSTO, OEC, SCO and CIS. To make the regional architecture work in 
Southeast Asia and East Asia, the role of Japan was essential; for the integration projects in the 
post-Soviet arena, a leadership role is yet to be played by Russia. 
During the Soviet Union era, Central Asia was oriented towards the north and the west 
while the southern and eastern directions remained closed. With the end of the Cold War and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the new states of Central Asia have received a historical chance 
to reach independence, to defi ne their future with regard to international relations, and to exer-
cise their own sovereignty. Today, there is no ‘iron wall,’ and no Cold War; the world of today is 
one of globalization and open borders, including the formerly closed areas to the east (China and 
East Asia) and south (South Asia). New options are now open, and new dimensions for coopera-
tion are available. But included in these options is the possibility that without strong cooperation 
among the Central Asian states, the formerly closed countries of China and India may wish to 
force their ways into this new Central Asian region. Central Asia has been given an opportunity 
to return to itself and act according to its nature, if done with a sense of urgency.  But, in order to 
do this, it must unite, for only through regional cooperation can Central Asia fi nalize the post-So-
viet disintegration and further advance its regional re-integration. Petty differences need to be set 
aside, for small, independent countries with valuable resources but too little security will likely 
not last long in the neighboring yards of increasingly powerful, heavily populated countries look-
ing for space.   
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Table 1: Basic Information on Central Asian States
Country Territory (sq km) Population (July 2010 est.) Government type
GDP per capita (2009 
est, in US dollars)
Kazakhstan 2,724,900 15,460,484 Authoritarian pres-
idential rule
11,800
Kyrgyzstan 199,951 5,508,626 Fledgling parlia-
mentary republic
2,100
Uzbekistan 447,400 27,865,738 Authoritarian pres-
idential rule 
2,800
Tajikistan 143,100 7,487,489 Republic 1,800
Turkmenistan 488,100 4,940,916 Authoritarian pres-
idential rule
6,900
Total 2,935,637 61,263,253 Authoritarian pres-
idential rule
Average GDP per 
capita: 5,080
Source:  CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed July 12, 2010) 
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Appendix II: 
Table 2: Basic Information on Southeast Asian and East Asian States
Country Territory (sq km) Population (July 2010 est.) Government type
GDP per capita (2009 
est, in US dollars)
ASEAN states
Thailand 513,120 66,404,688 Constitutional 
monarchy
8,100
Burma 676,578 53,414,374 Military regime 1,100
Brunei 5,765 395,027 Constitutional 
sultanate
50,100





Indonesia 1,904,569 242,968,342 Republic 4,000
Laos 236,800 6,993,767 Communist state 2,100
Malaysia 329,847 26,160,256 Constitutional 
monarchy
14,800
Philippines 300,000 99,900,177 Republic 3,300
Singapore 697 4,701,069 Parliamentary 
republic
50,300
Vietnam 331,210 89,571,130 Communist state 2,900
Sub-total for 
ASEAN
4,479,621 605,262,150 Average: 13,860
East Asian States 





South Korea 99,720 48,636,068 Republic 28,000
China 9,596,961 1,330,141,295 Communist state 6,600
Sub-total: 10,074,596 1,505,581,796 Average: 22,400
Total for APT 14,554,217 2,110,843,946 Average: 18,130
Source:  CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/  (accessed July 12, 2010) 
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Source:  Koichi Sato, “The ASEAN Regime: Its Implications for East Asia Cooperation–A Japanese View,” in 
Tamio Nakamura, ed., The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective, Institute 
of Social Science Research Series, No. 24, University of Tokyo, 2007, p. 22. (Reproduced by permis-
sion of Dr. Koichi Sato)
Updates to Figure 1 as of November 1, 2010:
ASEM includes Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, ASEAN Secretariat, Australia,  -
New Zealand and Russia.
EAS expects Russia and the United States to become regular members in 2011 (decided at the Summit  -
held in Hanoi on October 30, 2010).
ARF includes Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. -
Appendix III: ASEAN States and Dialogue Partners
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Note: Uzbekistan suspended its membership at the Eurasian Economic Community in November 2008.
Source: Author
Appendix IV: The Multilayered Structure of Regional Institutions in the Post-Soviet Space 
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